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MATHEMATICAL FORESIGHT: THINKING
IN THE FUTURE TO WORK IN THE
PRESENT
WES MACIEJEWSKI, BILL BARTON

Think about the following:
You’re playing a mathematical game with a large number of people, all of whom are reading this article. Each
of you needs to select a natural number between 0 and
100, inclusive. The winner of this game is the person,
or persons, who selects the number closest to twothirds the average of all numbers selected. Assuming
you’d like to win, what number should you choose?
How did you solve this problem? “Assuming everyone
selects a number at random,” you think, “the average would
be 50. Two-thirds of 50 is about 33. I should select that!” But
your other mental voice interjects, “Ah! But everyone else is
thinking the same! Therefore, they all select 33. Two-thirds
of 33 is 22. That’s the number…” “Wait!” Back and forth
your mind lobs. “I can see this continuing…I’ll select 0.”
Phrased in mathematical jargon, the above problem is
asking you to find the Nash Equilibrium of the given situation. If we had written the problem in such terms, some of
you would not have made any progress while others would
perhaps have selected 33 or one of the numbers along the
sequence. Still others would have seen that the answer is 0
and engaged in the type of iterative thinking caricatured
above. The present article expands on this last type of experience, of solving a mathematical problem by first seeing a
resolution and a path leading to that resolution unfold into
the near, problem-solving future.
The above game is seemingly a small, one-off problem.
We claim, however, that this kind of thinking—seeing a
resolution and way to that resolution—is a general phenomenon in certain mathematical work, that in which no solution
schema is readily available. There is a sense in which mathematicians (broadly construed as users of mathematics)
engaged in this type of work are imagining future activity
and this “future thinking” drags their present actions forward, motivates them, and helps them to persist. Where do
these abilities come from? Experience? What aspect of
experience? Can these abilities be taught?
Perhaps the question that first needs asking is: how can
we best characterize these future-thinking abilities? There
are many ideas in the mathematics education literature that
may aid in a description—intuition, strategic knowledge,
an aesthetic sense, experience, heuristics, problem solving,
meta-cognition, and many more. We argue here that none
of these existing constructs quite captures a mathematician’s
25

future-thinking processes. Though each of these constructs
can weigh in on features of future thinking, they each have
come to encompass so much and in such diverse mathematical settings that we find we desire a precise, restricted
description of future-thinking processes in mathematics. In
this article, we therefore introduce and elaborate the construct of mathematical foresight, drawing on a series of
interviews with mathematicians to do so.
Mathematical foresight
We describe mathematical foresight as a process that a mathematician may engage in when faced with a new problem,
hypothesis, or situation, and when needing to work towards
a solution, a proof, some clarity, or a resolution. From their
starting point, we argue that a broad direction, or trajectory,
can be described in which the mathematician might travel,
although the exact path, with its detailed twists and turns,
may initially be unknown. At the end of this avenue, we suggest, a hazy shape might be seen of what the solution, proof,
or resolution will look like. We refer to this hazy shape as
the sphere of resolution. We consider mathematical foresight
as the mathematician’s developing awareness of this broad
resolution trajectory and sphere of resolution.
In our model, depicted in Figure 1 (overleaf), both the trajectory and destination are taken together. Usually, the
trajectory a mathematician pursues does not exist without
some idea of a destination, except in the case of mathematical exploration. And, as we discuss below, this idea is more
than an “intuition” of how to proceed: if pressed, the mathematician can articulate their choice of trajectory and
destination.
Mathematical foresight comes before the mathematician
sets out on their specific path. During subsequent work, situations are encountered where decisions need to be made about
what action should be performed next. These choices may
deviate from the initially conceived trajectory, hence moving
it, and possibly also shifting the sphere of resolution. In this
way, mathematical foresight is a dynamic process: each step
taken may revise the trajectory forward and will slowly bring
into more focus the sphere of resolution.
The choices made along the way involve Schoenfeld’s
(1985) notion of control: “the way people use the information potentially at their disposal” (Schoenfeld, 1985, p. 27).
His characterization of control as “decisions about what paths
to take (which also, therefore, determine what paths are not
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Figure 1. Mathematical foresight is conceptualized as being able to describe in advance the general direction of the resolution
trajectory and the shape of the sphere of resolution.

taken)” (p. 27) meshes well with our notion here. Mathematical foresight entails control: being able to see a resolution and
a path facilitates productive, disciplined mathematical behaviour, although the converse need not hold.
Our interviews with mathematicians confirm that they
recognise and value this process. Five mathematician colleagues, one female and four male, each from a different
field of pure or applied mathematics, each individually conversed with us about our initial foresight model. We asked
if they recognized such a process in their own work and
what it looked and felt like to them. All told us that they
regularly engage in an activity accurately described by
mathematical foresight, and have given us examples that
have refined its characteristics. One mathematician
described their experience with mathematical foresight as
follows:
For me it sort of resonated a little bit in terms of, you
see things when you’re trying to get to some result or
so, you know that this is a dead end well before you
reached it. And you know when things are going to
work out well before you’ve really worked out the
details. But, as I started to think about why and how
do you actually know this. The more it’s, it’s experience! It’s like you’ve seen it before, which is weird
because you’re doing something new, so you can’t have
seen it before. But somehow it feels familiar. (M1)
They told us that foresight typically happens quite quickly
on first meeting the mathematical situation and contributes
to the mathematician’s anticipation of how to proceed.
Boero (2001) writes, for example, in the context of algebraic
problem solving:
A common ingredient of all the processes of transformation […] is anticipation. In order to direct the
transformation in an efficient way, the subject needs to
foresee some aspects of the final shape of the object to
be transformed related to the goal to be reached, and
some possibilities of transformation. This “anticipation”
26

allows planning and continuous feed-back. (p. 99)
Thus, the act of choosing a problem to work on is one of
the functions of foresight:
I can tell you exactly what is the right problem for me to
work on now. But in fact there are 10 people working on
it now who possibly have more time or whatever. I can
identify the problem as important. I can identify that in
principle I could contribute to it, but I will choose not
to work on it until I have got really an angle that I think
“Ah ha I don’t think anyone working on it is doing that”.
[…] Having a strategy is part of how you choose a problem. Not the other way around, that you would choose
a problem then think of a good strategy. (M1)
I can’t imagine surviving as a pure mathematician without [foresight] because you need to come up with new
projects and so on … and so you need to move in directions from which new things can bubble off easily. And
I think that seeing a direction will be rich from your
own point of view, but also then rich for other points
of view, and will link in to things that other people are
interested in and know about. (M2)
Mathematical foresight is just one process in which a
mathematician may engage when encountering a mathematical situation. There are others and we imagine these
processes as residing on a continuum, like that represented
in Figure 2. On one end there is automaticity, in which the
mathematician responds to the situation without conscious
thought. Automaticity may occur with simple arithmetic, for
example. Next to situations that evoke automaticity are those
that evoke problem schema: a means to resolve a problem
situation that has been reinforced with prior success. The
first-year calculus instructor has seen, and assigned to their
students, practically every possible undergraduate differential calculus problem and their process of solving any given
one requires only the activation of the appropriate problem
schema. On the other end of the continuum is inertness: the
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Figure 2. Ways in which a mathematician might act upon
encountering a mathematical situation. The line
segment represents a continuum of mathematical
situations and is labeled according to possible
actions taken by an individual mathematician.
total inability to navigate the mathematical situation. Inertness could arise, for example, when a mathematician
encounters a situation completely removed from their area
of expertise. A mathematical biologist is unlikely to gain any
traction on a problem in algebraic number theory, let alone
understand, or indeed recognize the terms involved.
Situations likely to invoke mathematical foresight reside
toward the right of our imaginary continuum (see Figure 2).
These situations are not so familiar to the mathematician that
they invoke problem schema but are familiar enough to be
understandable and potentially resolved.
Examples of mathematical foresight
Mathematical foresight is one process among many in which
a mathematician may engage during a mathematical activity.
As mentioned above, research-level mathematics often
involves foresight, but what other types of activities are
likely to elicit foresight?
A mathematician colleague gave an example of having
foresight when lecturing. He had not fully prepared the lecture but was confident that he could prove the relevant
theorem. It had four parts: the first was straightforward, the
second he had recognized as suitable to hold back as a problem for the students, and the third was a direct argument.
Then the fourth part he realized he did not know; however,
he just thought “I’ll use proof by contraposition”, simply
because he recognized that that was appropriate: “It just
appeared that this is somehow the right way to go through it.
It is a familiar thing to do, but it was not like ‘I remember
this is the right way to do it’.” He linked this teaching experience to research: “it felt the same as when you are doing
research. You’d be like ‘Umm I think this is the way to go’.
And that’s not memory, when you’re doing research it is
not memory.”
Another example is the act of forming a conjecture. Conjectures are anticipated mathematical relationships lacking
formal justification. But conjectures are not arrived at only by
happenstance. They are often presented alongside strong
empirical evidence of their veracity and/or the poser’s program for establishing the relationship rigorously. Of course,
conjecturing does take on many forms. Fermat’s last conjecture (Theorem) was likely arrived at empirically but did not
have accompanying suggestions for its proof (aside from
“buy a book with larger margins”), while many contemporary conjectures are buttressed by both evidence and a
research program. An interesting example is William
Thurston’s Geometrization Conjecture, a corollary of which
is the Poincaré Conjecture. Prosaically, the conjecture states

that there are only so many geometries, like the familiar
Euclidean and spherical geometry, in three dimensions.
Thurston had an approach to the conjecture, and applied it
to a specific class of geometric objects. Richard Hamilton
subsequently contributed what became the key insight—considering the “Ricci flow” on a given object—and provided a
program with which the conjecture could be proved. Two
decades later, Grigori Perelman was able to carry out this
program. We take this example as one of collective mathematical foresight: a community of mathematicians sees the
resolution and a likely path leading to it. This collective
mathematical foresight is a “scaled up” version of what a
mathematician may experience in solitude.
Foresight and related concepts
How does foresight relate to other mathematical processes?
In this section, we focus specifically on strategic thinking,
heuristics, problem solving, and intuition and, in so doing,
we necessarily leave out a number of other relevant ideas. At
this stage, we encourage the reader to think of how other
ideas might relate to mathematical foresight.
We take strategic thinking to be, following Weber’s
(2001) definition of strategic knowledge, choosing an action
among many that is likely to lead to progress toward a
desired end state. With this definition, strategic thinking is
what occurs after the foresight process; foresight lays a wide
path and strategic thinking traverses it. In our diagram (Figure 1), it is the process of deciding on the short arrows that
make up the resolution path.
Weber (2001) identified four types of strategic knowledge
needed for proving: knowledge of i) typical proofs in the
domain, ii) relevant theorems and when to apply them, iii)
when to use syntactic and semantic approaches, and iv) relevant facts. In this way, strategic thinking is making
progress on a mathematical problem by allowing the solver
to relate the current problem to previously solved problems
and to recognize and activate relevant knowledge.
The difference between strategic thinking and foresight
is primarily one of scale. Hence, they can coincide when
the situation or problem is not complex for the solver. For
example, proving that the shortest distance between two
points is a straight line requires only appealing to the triangle inequality. Recognizing that this is a likely path to a
proof is an instance of mathematical foresight, but also fits
comfortably in Weber’s definition of strategic knowledge.
What is needed of a mathematical situation to distinguish
foresight and strategic thinking is sufficient distance
between the starting state and the desired end state; a characteristic of the problems described in the right-half region
of Figure 2. Such a problem would have many components
and stopping places at which the solver must choose a way
forward. Mathematical foresight is a preliminary, global
view of the resolution destination and trajectory and may aid
in making strategic decisions along the way.
How is foresight different from heuristics, or general
problem-solving tactics? We use Schoenfeld’s (1985) definition: “The use of a general problem-solving strategy is
heuristic if the problem solver is having difficulty, and there
is no reason to suspect that taking this particular approach
might help” (p. 60). Heuristics are therefore more closely
27
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related to, but distinct from, strategic thinking, amounting to
a set of generalised ways of acting in a class of situations
that may contribute to strategic decisions. Unlike foresight,
heuristics are not dependent on the specific context, and will
not contribute to understanding the nature of a resolution to
a problem, although they might guide some aspects of the
resolution trajectory.
We turn now to the most closely-related and nebulous
construct: intuition. Mathematicians often speak of having
an “intuitive understanding” of a concept, and of the “intuition” behind a proof. Intuition has featured prominently in
writings about the nature of mathematical work (see, for
example, Poincaré, 1905), and many mathematicians do recognize the importance of intuition in their practice (Burton,
2004). But despite this high degree of interest, intuition has
come to be used colloquially as a catch-all phrase for nonrigorous mathematical activity and understanding.
In an effort to operationalize intuition, Fischbein (1987)
identified five features:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Immediacy: a conclusion is reached instantly from
limited perceptual data.
Self-evidence: the conclusion is formed without any
further analytical thinking.
Extrapolativeness: the conclusion goes beyond what is
present in the perceived situation.
Coerciveness: the intuitor is convinced of the veracity
of the conclusion.
Globality: the conclusion transcends the given situation.

To see the role of each of these features, consider which
arise when answering the question, “what is the shortest
distance between two points?”
These characteristics allowed Fischbein to identify four
types of intuitions. The first is affirmatory, or statements that
are “obviously” true (“The shortest distance between two
points is a straight line”). The second, conjectural, is the
production of believed-to-be true statements that may or
may not be able to be substantiated (“I know the Riemann
Hypothesis is true,” or, “you will make an excellent mathematics teacher”). Conclusive intuitions summarize a
mathematical event and provide a global overview (“the
intuition behind this proof is…”).
The final type, anticipatory, is closest to mathematical
foresight. What defines an anticipatory intuition? In one
context, Fischbein writes, “anticipatory intuitions represent
the preliminary, global view which precedes the analytical,
fully developed solution to a problem” (Fischbein, 1987, p.
61), while, in another, he writes, “while striving to solve a
problem one suddenly has the feeling that one has grasped
the solution even before one can offer any explicit, complete
justification for that solution” (Fischbein, 1982, p. 10). But
some of the features of intuition do not apply to foresight.
Foresight is not necessarily immediate and is a continuously
evolving process, not a single state. It may involve some
analytical thinking, and is not held with total certainty. For
us, another difference is that foresight is potentially justified.
Mathematicians speak as if they have grounds for their foresight and could give those grounds if necessary, by referring
to previous experience, citing similar situations, recognizing
28

the situation as being in a class of problems, or drawing on
features of the given situation that suggest a way forward.
The psychological nature of foresight
One mathematician suggested that foresight requires an
“information field” which may be made up of many different sorts of things: experiences, metaphoric references, prior
knowledge, and so on, all of which makes “foresighting” a
personal experience. This idea reinforced the way mathematics researchers seemed to personalise their experiences
of foresight, phrasing it as “I would need that kind of math
and I would do it this way” rather than, “that math is
needed”. For example:
And so what I see as a path, and is crystal clear to me
[…] is only so to me and not necessarily to another person who’s working on the problem […] you think about
it and say, well if I would do it, then I would go about
it this way. (M3)
You get a sense of what things you’ll be able to solve so
[…] I think with things you understand very well, even
if you have a new idea in that area you sort of think,
well I know this area so well I’ll be able to sort it out
one way or another […] I’ll corner this thing and sort
it out. (M2)
Statements like the above led us to consider that the mental
processes involved in mathematical foresight are analogous
to those involved in planning any to-be-experienced event.
When planning a meal, for example, a chef forms a mental
image of what dishes will be served, how they will taste,
what ingredients are required, and the order in which each
should be cooked, so that finishing times are coordinated.
This planning is all done prior to grocery shopping or turning on the stove. Such thinking led us into discussions with
psychologists concerned with memory, and some of the
associated literature.
The example of a chef is an instance of someone engaging
in episodic future thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). While
planning, the chef is not only making a grocery list, they
are pre-experiencing an event by projecting themselves into
the future and forming a memory of an event that has yet to
occur. This ability to form future memories is intimately
related to episodic memory: the memory of events already
experienced (Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007). The more
experience the chef has in the kitchen, the more able they are
to pre-experience preparing a meal. The key, here, is that
the to-be-experienced event does not necessarily have to be
too similar to any actually previously experienced event; it
can be entirely novel.
Episodic memory is one of two types of declarative memory, the other being semantic memory: the memory of facts
(Tulving, 1983). These two types of memory are distinct: I
can remember that water boils at 100°C but may not have
experienced establishing this fact. Semantic memories can
aid in the construction and recall of future memories, but are
limited in their capacity to do so. To form effective future
memories, with sufficient detail to be useful, both episodic
and semantic memories are needed. In the context of mathematics, these two memory systems working in concert are
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the hallmark of the mathematician’s work. A mathematician
is good at mathematics because they both know and have
experienced a great deal of mathematics.
Educational implications
Having identified and described an apparently valuable
mathematical process, we are now concerned with how it
develops in undergraduate students, how we might observe
foresight, and whether we, as educators, can assist students
with its development. The mathematicians we interviewed
recognized the development of their own mathematical foresight and some were able to locate its genesis:
In some senses it is linked to communication. I think I
became aware of this in undergraduate. And I think it
would come through tutoring. It comes through tutoring, the awareness. I am sure my memory was not that
good, and I was tutoring when I was 20 years old. They
were doing first year mathematics, they said they don’t
know how to solve a problem and I was like “well you
try to get a feeling of this is the right sort of thing to do”
and I would have some kind of foresight. Even it’s a
very simple thing, this sort of integration you know,
do you use integration by parts, do you use substitution.
Most people at some point get a feeling of how to solve
certain thing. I think I could recognize that way back
from my undergraduate. But I suspect that through
interacting with others, if I was doing the problem on
my own it’s not something I would think about. But as
soon as you start teaching, communicating, trying to
help with someone who is stuck. It sort of raises up on
your mind “how do I know it?” (M1)
We note that well-intentioned attempts to teach “soft”
mathematical skills like intuition, creativity, heuristics, or
problem solving have not consistently proven successful.
We offer a response to Burton’s (1999) question, “Why is
intuition so important to mathematicians but missing from
mathematics education?” Intuition is not taught because it
cannot be taught. Neither can problem solving or creativity.
These constructs are too broad and have come to encompass so much that they have become unworkable in
education. Aspects of each can be taught, such as the five
heuristic strategies in Schoenfeld’s (1985) intensive, smallscale study, but teaching “problem solving” remains akin to
teaching “mathematics”.
Will attempts to teach foresight fail in the same way? Can
we avoid the generalization trap that is described above, or
can the context-specific and personal nature of foresight be
utilized in a different way so that students’ abilities in the
area are enhanced? If intuition is un-grounded feelings that
something is the case, can we help students use what knowledge and experience they have to create grounded feelings?
We note that some aspects of Olympiad training do just this:
students are alerted to “big ideas” that recur, such as the
pigeon-hole principle, and the class of problems with which
it is likely to be useful. Perhaps simply alerting students to
the existence and nature of foresight will help them to use
their mathematical information fields in productive ways?
In psychology, the development of general episodic, nonmathematical foresight has been recognized in young

children. The emergence of domain-specific foresight, like
in the chef example above or in mathematical foresight, has
not been investigated, although the assumption that such
foresight arises from greater experience in the given domain
appears to be implicit. This leads us to ask, does comparable experience result in comparable foresight? If not, where
does the variation come from?
When learning mathematics at any given stage, there is a
central concept at hand to be learned. In the words of Vinner
and Hershkowitz (1980) and Tall and Vinner (1981), for
example, there is a central concept definition. Students will all
experience the learning of, and come to know, this concept in
idiosyncratic ways; they each form a personal concept image.
When working in a mathematical problem situation, students
often rely strictly on their concept images. At the outset, they
may or may not see how to make progress on the problem.
That is, they may or may not have foresight. In psychological studies of foresight, people were more able to simulate
future events, and have these simulations later recalled, when
they had increased familiarity with the “actors” in those
events: the people, places, and things involved (McLelland,
Devitt, Schacter & Addis, 2014). In fact, the process of imagining future events has been shown to activate the same neural
processes as remembering past events (Schacter, Addis &
Buckner, 2007). Taking this perspective, a student’s (in)ability
to engage in mathematical foresight may serve as an indicator of the richness of their concept images.
The converse relationship, mathematical foresight from
understanding, is less clear. Our interviews with mathematicians suggest that mathematical foresight does not readily
develop through engaging in more mathematical activity. A
couple of our mathematician colleagues indicated that their
mathematical foresight developed through conscious, deliberate effort; experience tills the soil, and knowledge is the
seed, but much more is needed for a good crop. As Schoenfeld (1985) recognizes, “experience” is a part of becoming
a better problem solver, but it is insufficient as a complete
explanation. What it is about experience that makes it productive and shifts students to more mathematical thinking
and behaviour is an open question.
We hope that our characterization of mathematical foresight is sufficient that it can be identified in student activity
and its development scaffolded. We have begun work in this
direction (Maciejewski & Barton, 2016; Maciejewski,
Roberts & Addis, 2016). In a first attempt to observe mathematical foresighting by students, we have presented student
volunteers with a number of mathematical situations and
asked them to think about how they would resolve each. An
analysis of students’ inscriptions and utterances made while
thinking about solving problems indicates that students do
engage in a form of mathematical foresight, though many
of our volunteers did struggle with forming resolutions to
the situations. What remains is to chart how mathematical
foresight develops in students. We are motivated by the
observation that mathematical foresight appears to be strong
in mathematicians and not as much in students. Where along
the way in a mathematical education is this skill developed
or strengthened?
What is the benefit of developing students’ mathematical
foresight? If mathematical foresight is an essential part of
29

FLM 36(3) - NOVEMBER 2016_FLM 2016-10-26 9:51 PM Page 30

mathematicians’ practice, what benefit does the development
of mathematical foresight have for those students who take
mathematics courses yet will never become mathematicians;
that is, the majority of our students? At a practical level, we
see mathematical foresight making a contribution in encouraging persistence in working on mathematical problems of
all kinds in all contexts; that is, not just research mathematics
but in any mathematical career. We believe that a student who
is able to see the general shape of the resolution of a mathematical situation and the general trajectory of the path to that
resolution is more likely to start on, and to persist in, working
mathematically. Our grander hope is that the development
of a student’s mathematical foresight will improve their
autonomy as a mathematics learner. Mathematicians use
foresight to choose interesting problems and directions to
head, to solve these problems, and to persist and make
progress. Might the same happen for our students?
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